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ILLUSIONS OF IMMEDIACY: REDISCOVERING HALL’S EARLY WORK ON 
MEDIA 
NICK COULDRY   
 
Abstract 
In this short article I analyse Hall’s neglected early work on media and its account of how 
ideology is reproduced through the everyday workings of media institutions. I trace the 
importance of that work through later work on the mythical aspects of media institutions 
(Couldry) and more recent work on the culture of connectivity (Van Dijck) and its 
appopriation of the social in the form of social media platforms.  
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Through David Morley, I had the good fortune to have access to Hall’s early and little known 
writings on mass media in the 1970s. The importance of those early writings of Hall for us in 
deconstructing today’s illusions of immediacy will be my starting-point for this discussion.  
 
Today we must make sense of emerging spaces of social life which depend on digital 
platforms (platforms for so-called ‘social’ media), the beneficiaries that are the focus of 
corporate investment on a scale which mass media institutions never received! It is easy to 
think these platforms are the sites of our ‘media life’, that they are where all opportunities for 
the transformation of society and politics are played out. But, in the tradition of Stuart Hall, I 
want to argue that this is an illusion, indeed a myth, which we must deconstruct, without 
losing touch with the possibility that, in ways we have yet to understand, institutions 
something like social media platforms can play a part in a more democratic future.  
 
Hall’s early work on media is still largely neglected, but needs to be placed in the context of 
the move made by both Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall to extend the materialism of 
Marx in order to encompass the material underpinnings of culture itself. As Williams put it, it 
was essential to go beyond Marx’s crude distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ and 
develop a ‘notion of cultural production’ (1979: 139). Indeed we needed to understand ‘the 
production of a cultural order’ as ‘itself material’ (1977: 93). Hall, in turn, in his famous 
essay ‘Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms’ argued that language needed to be regarded as a 
material process within what he called ‘a properly materialist theory of culture’ (reprinted in 
1996: 48).  
 
While both Williams and Hall worked towards a shared goal of the Marxist deconstruction of 
culture, there were tensions too. For Williams (1975: 31), communications technology is ‘a 
social complex of a new and central kind’, but he remained interested in exploring the 
possibilities for that technology and its institutions to generate representations of the social 
world which resonated with daily experience in what Williams called ‘a whole way of life’. 
But it was precisely experience that proved a faultline between Hall and Williams, and indeed 
an issue within feminist debates and elsewhere. In a 1980 essay called ‘Politics and Letters’, 
Hall argued that Williams was wrong to emphasise the wholeness of culture as a way of life, 
and insisted on the need to ‘deconstruct the “lived wholeness” in order to be able to think its 
determinate conditions’ (Hall 1989: 62). Whether or not Hall’s critique of Williams was fair 
on this point,1 that will to deconstruct is the aspect of Hall’s early writings on media most 
essential for us today, faced as we are with a new and intensely mythicised way of life in, and 
through, media.   
 
I will develop these thoughts, first, by recalling some of Stuart Hall’s early unpublished 
writings and, second, by exploring a thread that connects those neglected works to later work 
on mass media and more recently on social media platforms.  
  
One aspect of Hall’s work on media is very widely known: the encoding/ decoding essay that 
inspired audience studies from the late 1970s which I will not discuss further. Also well-
known is Hall’s essay on ‘The Determination of News Photographs’ published in 1981 
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(based on an original paper published  from Birmingham in 1972). This offers a reading of 
the coding of photographic images and their ideological significance that draws heavily on 
Barthes and Althusser. It also, perhaps more surprisingly, involves a social constructionism 
of a sort which is hard to accept any more. So, for example, Hall writes that ‘what is already 
known. . . is a set of common sense constructions and ideological interpretations about the 
world, which holds the society together at the level of everyday beliefs’ (1981: 236). News 
photographs work, for Hall, above all to confirm the sense of an already mythical historic 
present. Nor do I have space here to discuss the rich and multi-levelled account of how media 
institutions represent the social world in Policing the Crisis (Hall et al 1978): that book needs 
no further discussion.  
 
Instead, I am more interested here in two longer and more general essays from the early 
1970s about the workings of media’s mechanisms of representation that have been little 
discussed (but see Corner 1995: chapter 1) and are still largely unknown.  
 
Hall’s early work on media 
 
I want first to discuss the 1971 essay ‘Television as a Medium and its Relation to Culture’ 
(originally part of a report sent to UNESCO on British Television, but which was circulated 
by the Birmingham Centre in 1975: it remains unpublished).  Here too, Hall draws on 
Barthes’ idea that photographic images carry with them an ‘illusion of transparency or 
immediacy’ (1975: 100), but he says much more about the complex institution of television 
in general and the ways in which what he calls ‘the social idioms and practices’ (1975: 104) 
of television collapse any awareness of television as a process of mediation, and substitute for 
it a mythical sense of television as a ‘window on the world’.  
 
Some of the technological context of Hall’s essay seems extremely remote to us now – the 
difference that colour broadcasting made to television: that is the price of Hall’s insistence on 
engaging in detail with the media culture of his time.2  But other aspects still resonate 
strongly today, such as the discussion of television as a hybrid medium that draws and uses 
many older media together, just as remediation is the basic process of digital media today 
(1975: 89). Most enduring is Hall’s analysis of how ideological work is done through 
everyday television, and particularly through the role of the ‘presenter’ who links together 
diverse slices of film and discussion in a way that is structured and framed by ‘collective 
values and attitudes’ (1975: 95). Here Hall links the banal formatting details of everyday 
television to the wider role that TV as an institution plays in wider culture. The whole 
process, Hall argues, is ‘underpinned by the “utopia” that . . television does not select or 
reproduce at all: it simply shows what is already there’ (1975: 107, added emphasis). I will 
return to the significance of this later.  
 
Even more striking is a slightly later essay, written for a 1973 UNESCO conference on 
‘Obstacles to Communication’ but also circulated at Birmingham in 1975, called ‘The 
“Structured Communication” of Events’: published later as Hall 2007). This long essay takes 
considerably further the implications for broader power of medias’s way of presenting 
‘reality’. Within a Gramscian analysis of how consent to a powerful social and political order 
is won, Hall foregrounds the processes which ‘structure’ the production of news. While the 
notion of ‘codes’ appears at various points in the essay, it is not essential to the argument, 
which could just as well be developed outside semiotics in terms of practices of 




Hall is concerned in that piece with how raw news material is framed within the news 
production and news presentation process: this framing is not a free process of interpretation, 
but a deeply structured process, linked ultimately to television’s relations to government and 
other powerful institutions. ‘The flow of communications is thus structured, not only by the 
exploratory frameworks within which the media signify events, but at the previous stage: the 
stage at which events and topics become visible to the media at all, the stage at which an 
event is defined as “signifiable”’ (Hall 2007: 373). The pre-determined closeness of 
television to key institutional actors leads, Hall writes, to the ‘systematic “overaccessing” of 
certain groups’ in television’s narratives (2007: 378) and their power to contribute to the 
shaping of the relevant narrative: by contrast, the general public has a reactive role only, and 
individual voices along the public are interchangeable with others (2007: 379). Most 
important, whatever the relative independence of television as an institution (Hall refuses a 
crude economic reductionism), it benefits from a power asymmetry that is absolute: a 
‘fundamental asymmetry’ between the media professions who make media and those, the 
audience, who receive it (2007: 370).  
 
Some might argue that it is exactly this sort of asymmetry between big media and the 
audience that we have moved beyond in the digital age, condemning this earlier work of Hall 
to irrelevance. But that would be exactly wrong. On the contrary, understanding social media 
platforms as institutions involves grasping the significance of new, but equally fundamental, 
asymmetries, even if they are materialized through a very different process of representation 
from the television news of the mass media era. Indeed this is where one last 1970s essay by 
Hall, ‘Culture, The Media and “the Ideological Effect”’ (Hall 1977), continues to have real 
bite. There Hall builds on his specific analysis (in the two essays just discussed) of how 
media construct audiences’ sense of social difference and the social totality of society in what 
he memorably calls ‘the construction of selective social knowledge’ (1977: 340). Here Hall 
obliquely recalls social constructionism and the legacy of Berger and Luckmann (1966), but 
in a much sharper way than in the original ‘News Photographs’ essay.  
 
Hall goes on to articulate a view of ideology as ‘common sense’ which articulates eloquently 
exactly our battles today to grasp the banal power of a platform like Facebook: ‘ideologies 
are the sphere of the lived – the sphere of experience, rather than of “thinking”’ (1977: 326). 
Contrary to traditional Marxism and drawing on Gramsci, Hall sees ideology as not specific 
ideas but as lying in ‘precisely . . . what is most open, apparent, manifest – what “takes place 
on the surface and in view of all men”’ (1977: 325).   
 
There is of course a big difference between how we might approach the analysis of ideology 
today from Hall’s formulations in the 1970s. It is virtually impossible now to argue that 
ideology works exclusively in the service of a specific set of class or group interests (what 
Hall called ‘the “definitions of reality” favourable to the dominant class fractions’ 1977: 
332); and it is impossible now to argue that the workings of ideology always resolve in one 
direction to produce ‘the primary “lived reality” as such for the subordinate classes’ (1977: 
332-333). Not only has the political landscape lost many of its distinct reference-points, 
through globalization, neoliberalism and other large-scale transformations, but we have also 
had, in the form of Boltanski’s critique of Bourdieu’s version of post-Marxist deconstruction 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), some very strong arguments for recognising the pluralism of 
values in contemporary complex societies and the necessity of building critique from a 
different starting-point, that is, from the contradictions within everyday values, rather than 
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from some academic reference-point outside everyday experience. While there is more to say 
on the debate between Boltanski and Bourdieu, or on the fate of ideological analysis in 
sociology and cultural studies generally, no one would now formulate Hall’s deconstructive 
moves in the holistic way he did then. But the need to deconstruct today’s configurations of 
power and ways of living through media continues.  
 
 Holding onto Hall’s early work on Media 
 
The organization and nature of media, and our lived relations with media, has become hugely 
more complex than could be envisaged in the 1970s in an era of a handful of terrestrial TV, 
radio channels and newspapers. The depth to which media contents now penetrate everyday 
needs and practices could not have been predicted then. But this is all the more reason for 
holding onto Hall’s central insight that ideology lies in ‘what is most open, apparent, manifest 
– what “takes place on the surface and in view of all men”’ (1977: 325).   
 
The skill of a recent book such as Jose Van Dijck’s The Culture of Connectivity (2013) is, 
through detailed analysis of the business and other practical principles from which social 
media platforms have emerged as central institutions, to confront us with the puzzle that, 
within less than a decade, we have come to believe that it is on these platforms that social life 
must now be lived. The space of ‘the social’, on this reading, is a playground for deep 
economic battles about new forms of value, value generated from data, the data that we 
generate as we act online. For that reason, Van Dijck, rightly, avoids the term ‘social media’ 
and talks instead of an economically driven ‘culture’ of connectivity. Although Van Dijck 
does not cite Hall, the links back to Hall’s ‘properly materialist’ reading of ‘culture’ are clear.  
 
Nor is the link back to Hall a sudden one. When I began writing in the early to mid 1990s on 
audience studies, it was becoming clear that our understanding of media power would need to 
take account of the very varied things people did with media. In this context, I was interested 
(Couldry 2000b) in dealing directly with Hall’s main insight: the fundamental asymmetry at 
the heart of media’s symbolic power (the asymmetry between those in media institutions and 
those outside) that is also at the heart of media institutions’ work within the social. But I saw 
the sites where ideology and the legitimacy of media power are reproduced as more varied 
than previously understood, indeed as taking up the whole space of everyday life (following 
Foucault’s approach to the distributed nature of power).  
 
Building on Hall’s work on the material work that media representations do, I tried to break 
down how media power is sustained into a number of dimensions which are rarely separated 
out from each other: the framing of reality whereby media marked off a particular 
presentation of events as the general social reality at which we need to look; the ordering of 
reality, that is, certain hierarchical distinctions built into media discourse, and in particular 
the hierarchy of what is in the media over what is not; and the naming of reality, that is 
media’s role in generating and underwriting what count as the specific facts about the world 
(Couldry 2000b: chapter 3). As we will see, these distinctions may have surprising relevance 
for a world other than broadcast media. My approach also drew something from Actor 
Network Theory which, in new ways, explained the materiality of what might otherwise be 
called cultural processes in terms of practical networks and linkages established and 
routinized between objects, resources and people (compare Callon and Latour 1980; Couldry 




I had no idea at that point that mobile phones would within a decade provide us with routine 
internet access, including, routinely, access to sites of social interaction with selected 
‘friends’ or as with Twitter with general population of varying sizes. But it was already clear 
by the early 2000s that our understanding of ideology’s workings through media needed to 
take more account of the embedding processes in everyday life, not just through the encoding 
of a particular media text.  
 
Looking back, I can also see my attempt to make sense of why we configure society around 
media institutions and their outputs through the notion of ‘the myth of the mediated centre’ as 
itself indebted to Hall’s early work on deconstructing media. I used the word ‘myth’ (Couldry 
2003) to help us see an underlying pattern in how, as societies, we make sense of organizing 
things around assumptions that certain types of information, expertise and knowledge are 
more valuable than others, and offer us a privileged view on the reality of social life. These 
myths are not merely an elite production: we are all, potentially, involved in producing these 
myths through our everyday actions. Media institutions work hard to sustain that myth, 
telling us we are all watching, that this programme or event shows ‘what’s going on’ for us as 
a society. So too do other institutions, such as governments and political parties, which 
depend on something like a mediated centre to underwrite their ‘space of appearances’. This 
is how media institutions’ symbolic power gets reproduced.  
 
But the myth of the mediated centre is no longer enough to grasp all that media are doing, 
and that we are now doing with media. It is not that large-scale ‘media’ have disappeared, or 
that media’s claims to be socially ‘central’ have diminished – arguably those claims have 
become more insistent. Rather the whole terrain of media (and media institutions) has been 
reshaped by huge external forces. And this is where today we need to draw on Hall’s early 
work on media even more explicitly. 
 
Deconstructing “Social” Media through Stuart Hall 
 
Hall argued in the 1970s that ideology lies in what is most open, apparent, manifest – what 
“takes place on the surface and in view of all men”’ (1977: 325).  Nothing is more ‘manifest’ 
today than the space of appearances which social media platforms sustain. And here, I 
suggest, is a key site where we should look if we want to find at work the ideologies (or at 
least the myths, in the sense that I have proposed) on which social political and economic 
organization today is starting to depend.   
 
As a new way of organizing our business and our lives around digital platforms becomes 
normalized, a new myth is emerging to make sense of this.  A myth about the collectivities 
we form when we use platforms such as Facebook. An emerging myth of natural collectivity 
that is particularly seductive, because here traditional media institutions seem to drop out 
altogether from the picture: the story is focussed entirely on what ‘we’ do naturally, when we 
have the chance to keep in touch with each other, as of course we want to do. David Morley 
and Charlotte Brunsdon (1978) had a brilliant phrase for the myth of the mediated centre at 
its mass media peak in the late 1970s: the ‘nation now’. Today we have: ‘us now’.3  The myth 
of us is not yet fully established: if the myth of the mediated centre took decades to become 
so, the myth of ‘us’ too will only fully stabilise over time. ‘Us’: the collectivity of everyday 
people, everywhere. Vague as it is, this claim grounds any number of specific rhetorics and 
judgements about what’s happening, what’s trending, and so (by a self-accumulating logic) 




There is no collectivity, no ‘us’, of the sort we have come to talk about around social media, 
until those platforms attract ‘us’ (whoever we are) to use them, and link to them. The myth of 
‘us’ is even less of a belief system than the myth of the mediated centre; it is more a basic 
form of orientation, as we perform the act of ‘being us’ on platforms that propose we do just 
that. The myth of ‘us’ is already being embedded into everyday language, making natural our 
sense that what happens on digital platforms of social interaction already is the social to 
which we must orient ourselves (Mejias 2013). And we need as Ulises Mejias argues to get a 
distance from this language, even if we cannot, simply, just withdraw from using social 
media platforms. 
 
The deconstructive stance of Hall’s early work on media institutions can still inspire us today, 
even in very different and apparently more de-centered, more complex and less massified 
circumstances. Yes, some will worry that such a deconstructive approach to social media will 
neglect the new sites where collective action is germinating. Certainly, I have not been 
arguing for neglect of social media practice, quite the contrary. But research  into social 
media must be conducted with caution, because on social media platforms it is the very 
possibility of an ‘us’ – and also of a certain type of individual oriented to endless self-
publicisation – that is being produced for motives that simulate a certain politics, yet remain 
fundamentally commercial. 
 
We can only grasp how ideology (particularly the neoliberal ideology of markets) is now 
operating in social life by following its norms into the smallest details of social life. Stuart 
Hall – with his continual suspicion of the constructed nature of ‘the popular’ - remains a 
crucial guide. A 1992 essay puts it well: ‘popular culture is not at all, as we sometimes think 
of it, the area where we find who we really are. It is an area that is profoundly mythic where 
we are imagined, where we are represented. Not only to the audiences out there who do not 
get the message, but to ourselves for the first time’ (Hall 1992: 22). As we puzzle over the 
desires and constraints at work in our world of platformed sociality, we would do well to 
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1
 It was in part, but there was a force to Williams’ insistence on experience, as I have argued  
elsewhere (Couldry 2000a: chapter 6; Couldry 2010: chapter 5). 
2
 Hall’s engagement with the media culture of his time was noted by both James Curran and 
Charlotte Brunsdon at the conference Stuart Hall: Conversations, Projects and Legacies  held 
at Goldsmiths, University of London on 28 November 2014.  
3
 For a more detailed diagnosis of the ‘myth of us’, see Couldry (2014). 
